Every state would become a "battleground," and every state vote would count in presidential elections without abolishing the Electoral College mechanism and without amending the Constitution if interested states adopted a new principle of awarding state electoral votes.
To understand the idea underlying this principle, let's consider a state with only two major party candidates competing for, say, 10 state electoral votes, and the candidates receiving 60 percent and 40 percent of the state votes, respectively.
Let's award six electoral votes to candidate one (whose party electors received 60 percent of the statewide popular vote), but let's put the remaining four electoral votes in play between the candidates. That is, let's award these four electoral votes to the candidate whose party increased (decreased) the number of its voting supporters - in the current election compared to the previous election - greater (less) than did the other party, and let's split these four electoral votes equally between the candidates if their parties increased (or decreased) the number of their voting supporters equally.
For instance, let candidate one and candidate two receive 1,200,000 and 800,000 state votes in the current election, respectively. Further, let candidate one's predecessor in the previous election receive 1,100,000, and let candidate two's predecessor in the previous election receive 696,000 votes.
Since the party of candidate two increased the number of its voting supporters by 800,000 minus 696,000 equals 104,000 voters, whereas the party of candidate one did it by 1,200,000 minus 1,100,000 equals 100,000 voters, candidate two is awarded four electoral votes in the current election, just as if the proportional principle of awarding (all) state electoral votes were in force.
Had candidate two received only 760,000 votes in the current election, the party of candidate two would have increased the number of its voting supporters only by 760,000 minus 696,000 equals 64,000, less than 100,000 voters, so all the (10) state electoral votes would've been awarded to candidate one, just as if the "winner-take-all" principle were in force.
Had candidate two received 796,000 votes in the current election, the party of candidate two would have increased the number of its voting supporters by 796,000 minus 696,000 equals 100,000, so four electoral votes would've been split equally, leaving candidate one with eight state electoral votes total and candidate two with two electoral votes.
The risk of losing a portion of the (guaranteed by the "winner-take-all") state electoral votes is likely to encourage the state's favorite to campaign there, whereas a chance of winning these electoral votes is likely to encourage the opponent to campaign there as well.
Since the increase (decrease) in the number of voting party supporters governs a portion of state electoral votes, every vote counts, creating a mechanism for encouraging both candidates to compete in "safe" states.
The proposed principle of awarding state electoral votes could easily turn Massachusetts into a "battleground" if the state decided to change its current "safe" (for the Democrats) status. In this case, up to five out of 12 electoral votes could be put in play in Massachusetts, and the candidates would compete here for every vote, like they do in such battlegrounds as New Mexico, Nevada, and West Virginia. However, only if the Democrats increased the number of their voting supporters in an election compared to the previous election greater than the Republicans, would the usual election outcome - all 12 electoral votes go to the Democrats - be the same, and it would be different, otherwise.
Since the Republicans would have a chance to receive five out of 12 electoral votes, their candidate would likely campaign in Massachusetts, forcing the Democratic candidate to compete here as well. In contrast, under the "winner-take-all," a "safe" minority of Massachusetts voters opposing the state's favorite - insufficient for a real state contest - can't affect the election outcome. Their votes are wasted, and neither major party candidate has a reason to campaign in the state.
The proposed principle "links" the election outcome in a state to the "performance" of each party candidate's predecessor in the previous election there. However, constitutionally, American voters vote for presidential electors, not for presidential candidates. In the case of political parties, state electors are party loyalists appointed by the parties to compete to represent the state in the Electoral College. They are chosen by party nominees and the state party leadership, and they represent party platforms.
By favoring party electors, voters support the party as much as they support the candidates, even when they like a particular candidate and dislike his/her party's platform. Unlike in the case of independent candidates, the "performance" of the party candidates cannot be considered as that of individuals only and cannot be separated from the "performance" of the parties, especially in mobilizing voters in "safe" states - in which major party candidates usually don't campaign.
In contrast, both the "winner-take-all" and its two alternatives - the district principle and the proportional principle - provide guarantees to one major party candidate or to both to win all or a portion of state electoral votes.
The "winner-take-all" principle guarantees that the state's favorite in the race will win all the state electoral votes. The district principle guarantees that each major party candidate will win state electoral votes in districts favoring his/her party, even if "at large" electoral votes are contested.
The proportional principle guarantees that both candidates will win certain portions of state electoral votes, whereas campaigning in a state is unlikely to change any long-settled ratio of votes to win even one extra electoral vote there.
Eliminating any such guarantees is key to encouraging presidential candidates to compete for every vote and to making "safe" states "battlegrounds," even without abolishing the Electoral College mechanism. By linking the "combined performances" of the parties and their candidates in two consecutive elections, the modified "winner-take-all" principle rewards voters supporting the opponent of the state's favorite with a chance to have a say in deciding the state's outcome, the chance which they are deprived of under the "winner-take-all."
The proposed modified "winner-take-all" principle - eliminating all these guarantees - is easily extended to cover situations with odd numbers of state electoral votes and (the party electors of) more than two candidates receiving state votes. The corresponding arithmetic is presented in the author's article to be published in Mathematical and Computer Modelling and available online at www.sciencedirect.com.
Alexander S. Belenky of Sudbury is a Ph.D. in systems analysis and applied mathematics and a visiting scholar at MIT's Center for Engineering Systems Fundamentals. He is the author of several books on U.S. presidential elections.
